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ABSTRACT
Ensuring fairness of machine learning systems is a human-in-the-
loop process. It relies on developers, users, and the general public to
identify fairness problems andmake improvements. To facilitate the
process we need effective, unbiased, and user-friendly explanations
that people can confidently rely on. Towards that end, we conducted
an empirical study with four types of programmatically generated
explanations to understand how they impact people’s fairness judg-
ments of ML systems. With an experiment involving more than
160 Mechanical Turk workers, we show that: 1) Certain explana-
tions are considered inherently less fair, while others can enhance
people’s confidence in the fairness of the algorithm; 2) Different
fairness problems–such as model-wide fairness issues versus case-
specific fairness discrepancies–may be more effectively exposed
through different styles of explanation; 3) Individual differences,
including prior positions and judgment criteria of algorithmic fair-
ness, impact how people react to different styles of explanation. We
conclude with a discussion on providing personalized and adaptive
explanations to support fairness judgments of ML systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, important decisions that impact human lives and so-
cietal progress are supported by machine learning (ML) systems.
Examples where ML systems are used to make decisions include
hiring, marketing, medical diagnosis, and criminal justice. This
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trend gives rise to concerns about algorithm fairness—or possi-
ble discriminatory consequences for certain groups of individuals.
Machine learning algorithms are trained based on data from past
decisions, decisions which may have themselves been biased and
discriminatory. Research shows that by optimizing for the unitary
goal of accuracy, ML algorithms trained on historical data not only
replicate, but may amplify existing biases or discrimination [40].
The possibility of spiraling discriminatory consequences is driving
a distrust and “fear of AI” in public discussions (e.g., [1, 2]).
There is a growing body ofwork on developing non-discriminatory
ML algorithms (e.g., [16, 17, 38]), equal attention has not been paid
to the human scrutiny necessary to identify and remedy fairness
issues. The need for such research is highlighted by recent studies,
which show that algorithmic fairness often may not be prescrip-
tively defined, but is multi-dimensional and context-dependent [14].
Public scrutiny of the usage of risk assessment algorithms in the
criminal justice system [3, 21] brings attention to the need to
progress the accountability and fairness of such algorithms.
Accurately identifying fairness issues in ML systems is extremely
challenging, however. Most ML algorithms aim to produce only
prediction or decision outcomes, while humans tend to rely on
information about decision-making processes to justify the decisions
made. ML algorithms are often seen as “black boxes”, where one
can only see the output and make a best guess about the underlying
mechanisms. This problem is further exacerbated by the popularity
of deep learning algorithms, which are often unintelligible even
for experts. This lack of transparency drives a sweeping call for
explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) in industry, academia, and
public regulation. For example, the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) requires organizations deploying ML systems
to provide affected individuals with meaningful information about
the logic behind their outputs.
Critically, explanations are not just for people to understand
the ML system, they also provide a more effective interface for the
human in-the-loop, enabling people to identify and address fairness
and other issues. When people trust the explanation, it follows that
they would be more likely to trust the underlying ML systems.
Much research is dedicated to generating explanations in various
styles, including model-agnostic approaches [26, 30] applicable to
any ML algorithm. However, this body of research is criticized
for “approaching this [XAI] challenge in a vacuum considering
only the computational problems” [27] without the quintessential
understanding of how people perceive and use the explanations.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on how people make
fairness judgments of ML systems and how explanation impacts
that judgment. We aim to highlight the nuances of such judgments,
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where there are different types of fairness issues, different styles
of explanation, and individual differences, to encourage future re-
search to take more user-centric and personalized approaches.
Specifically, we identify four styles of explanation based on prior
XAI work and automatically generate them for a ML model trained
on a real-world data set. In the experiment, we explore the effective-
ness of explanations in exposing two types of fairness issues–model-
wide unfairness produced by biased data, and fairness discrepancies
in cases from different regions of the feature space. Our user study
demonstrates that judging fairness is not only influenced by expla-
nation design, but also an individual’s prior position on algorithmic
fairness, including both the general trust of ML systems for deci-
sion support and one’s position on using a particular feature. We
also present user feedback for the four styles of explanation. Our
results provide insights on the mechanisms of people’s fairness
judgment of ML systems, and design guidelines for explanations to
facilitate fairness judgment making. We first review relevant work,
then present the study overview and research questions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Fairness of Machine Learning Systems
One of several definitions for algorithmic fairness is: “...discrimi-
nation is considered to be present if for two individuals that have the
same characteristic relevant to the decision making and differ only in
the sensitive attribute (e.g., gender/race) a model results in different
decisions” [8]. The consequence of deploying unfair ML systems
could be disparate impact, practices which adversely affect people
of one protected characteristic more than another in a comparable
situation [8, 14].
Despite the “statistical rationality” of ML techniques, it has been
widely recognized that they can lead to discrimination. Many rea-
sons can contribute to this, including biased sampling, incorrect
labeling (especially with subjective labeling), biased representa-
tion (e.g., incomplete or correlated features), suboptimal or insen-
sitive optimization algorithm, shift of population or data distribu-
tion, and failure to consider domain-specific, legal, or ethical con-
straints [8, 15]. Various techniques have been proposed to address
these causes of “unfair algorithms” [15–17, 38, 39]. For example
Calders and Žliobaite˙ suggested techniques to de-bias data [8], in-
cludingmodifying labels of the training data, duplicating or deleting
instances, adding synthetic instances, and transforming data into a
new representation space.
We use a recently proposed data de-biasing method that applies
a preprocessor to transform the data [9]. The result is a new dataset
which is “fairer”–while also limiting local deformations from the
data transformation. This is because the preprocessor optimizes
data transformations with respect to penalties that rise with the
magnitude of a feature change (e.g. changing a persons age from
5 to 60 will result in a higher penalty than from 5 to 8). Simply
put, if raw data contains biases that lead to an unfair model with
a discriminatory feature (e.g., certain racial category is weighed
more negatively than others), the data preprocessing mitigates the
bias introduced by that feature. This method has the benefit of
retaining all features (as opposed to removing the discriminatory
feature), which, among other benefits, would also allow exploration
of correlations among them [8].
The above debiasing techniques are normative by nature, i.e.,
they rely on prescriptively defining the criteria of fairness in order
to optimize for that criteria. A recent paper pursued a complemen-
tary descriptive approach by empirically studying how people judge
the fairness of features used by a decision support system in the
criminal justice system [14]. Their study uncovered the underly-
ing dimensions in people’s reasoning of algorithmic fairness, and
demonstrated individuals’ variations on these dimensions.
We adopt the same descriptive view, empirically studying how
people judge fairness of an ML system and considering individual
differences in their prior position on algorithmic fairness. However,
we also fill a gap in prior work by investigating how normative
fairness (via the use of the preprocessor) is perceived by people, and
what factors impact such perception.
2.2 Explanation of Machine Learning
Explainable AI (XAI) is a field broadly concerned with making AI
systems more transparent so people can confidently trust an AI
system and accurately troubleshoot it — fairness issues included.
Work on model explanations can be traced to early work on expert
systems [11, 33], which often explicitly revealed reasoning rules to
end-users. There has been a recent resurgence of XAI work driven
by the challenge to interpret increasingly complex ML models, such
as multi-layered neural networks, and by the evidence that ethical
concerns and lack of trust hampers adoption of AI applications [15,
22].
A large volume of XAI work is on producing more interpretable
models while maintaining high-level performance (e.g. [10, 23]),
or on methods to automatically generate explanations. Given the
complexity of current ML models, explanations are often peda-
gogical [34], meaning that they reveal information about how the
model works without faithfully representing the algorithms. Many
methods rely on some kind of sensitivity analysis to illustrate how
a feature contributes to the model prediction [26, 30], so they can
be model-agnostic, thus applicable to complex models. For exam-
ple, LIME explains feature contribution by what happens to the
prediction when the feature-values change (perturbing data) [30].
Another common category is case-based explanations, which use
instances in the dataset to explain the behavior of ML models. Ex-
amples include using counter-examples [36] and similar prototypes
from the training data [18]. Case-based explanations are considered
easy to consume and effective in justifying the decision, but may
be insufficient to explain how the model works.
Work on how people perceive explanations of ML systems is
a growing area [4, 20, 25, 32] which aims to inform the choices
and design of explanations for particular systems or tasks. Recent
work calls for taxonomic organizations of explanations to enable
design guidelines [25]. In earlier work on explaining expert systems,
researchers argued the difference between description v.s. justifi-
cation–by making not only the how visible to users, but also the
why [33]. Accordingly, Wick and Thompson discussed the taxon-
omy of global-local explanations [37]. During initial practice, users
may need global explanations that describe “how the systemworks.”
During actual use, users tend to rely on justifications of why the
system did what it did on particular cases.
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Another useful taxonomy is proposed by Kulesza et al. by consid-
ering two dimensions of explanation fidelity: soundness (how truth-
ful each element in an explanation is with respect to the underlying
system) and completeness (the extent to which an explanation de-
scribes all of the underlying system) [20]. They empirically showed
that the best mental models arose from explanations with both high
completeness and high soundness. However, crafting highly com-
plete explanations comes with a tradeoff, as completeness usually
requires increasing the length and complexity of the explanation,
which was shown to be detrimental to task performance and user
experience in previous studies [28].
While researchers have explored user preferences in explanation
styles, they have paid little attention to individual differences in
such preferences. Meanwhile, psychological research has long been
interested in individual differences in explanatory reasoning. For
example, research shows that some prefer simple, superficial ex-
planations and others are more deliberative and reflective in their
reasoning [13, 19]. Such individual differences can be predicted by
cognitive style (e.g., cognitive reflection, need for cognition) [13]
and culture [19]. It is therefore possible that individuals differ in
preferences for completeness and soundness of explanations.
Our work is concerned with how explanations impact fairness
judgments of ML systems. We build on a recent study by Binns et
al., which examined human perception of a classifier’s fairness in
the insurance domain [5]. They provided four different explanation
types applied to fictional scenarios to elicit fairness judgment. While
the study provided rich qualitative insights on the heuristics people
use to make fairness judgments, the authors acknowledge a lack of
ecological validity as the explanations were not drawn from real
ML model output. Moreover, the explanations were not produced
for the same data points, so they were incommensurate, which
could possibly explain the absence of conclusive preference in their
quantitative results.
Our work set out to overcome limitations on prior work by
automatically generating four types of explanations on a real ML
model, and quantitatively examining how they impact people’s
fairness judgments. Combining this advancement with the use
of the data preprocessor allowed us to perform more carefully
controlled experiments for ML fairness perception than prior work.
3 STUDY OVERVIEW
Related work informed four main considerations of our study: use
case, choices of explanation styles, fairness issues we focus on, and
the individual differences we explore. Through both quantitative
and qualitative results, we aim to answer the following RQs:
RQ1 How do different styles of explanation impact fairness judg-
ment of a ML system?
RQ1a Are some explanations judged to be fairer?
RQ1b Are some explanations more effective in surfacing un-
fairness in the model?
RQ1c Are some explanations more effective in surfacing fair-
ness discrepancies in different cases?
RQ2 How do individual factors in cognitive style and prior posi-
tion on algorithmic fairness impact the fairness judgment with
regard to different explanations?
RQ3 What are the benefits and drawbacks of different explana-
tions in supporting fairness judgment of ML systems?
3.1 Use Case: COMPAS recidivism data
We conducted an empirical study with a ML model trained on a
real data set. Similar to [14], we chose a publicly available data set
for predicting risk of recidivism (reoffending) with known racial
bias1. The data set was collected in Broward County, Florida over
a two year span. It is used by COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions), a commercial
algorithm to help judges score criminal defendants’ likelihood of
reoffending. However, ProPublica has reported on troubling issues
with the COMPAS system [3, 21]. First, the classifier may have low
overall accuracy ([3] reported 63.6%). Second, the model is reported
to exhibit racial discrimination, with African American defendants’
risk frequently overestimated.
We chose a criminal justice use case because it carries weight
to elicit reaction on fairness, even for the general population. Note
our goal is not to study the actual users of COMPAS. Rather, we
are using the use case as a “probe” to empirically study fairness
judgments. The same use case was used in previous studies to
understand how people perceive algorithmic fairness with regard
to features used [14].
3.2 Explanation Styles
We chose to programmatically generate the four types of expla-
nations introduced by Binns et al. [5] (details to be discussed in
System Overview section) because they represent a set of com-
mon approaches in recent XAI work. They embody the catego-
rization of global v.s. local explanations. Specifically, influence and
demographic-based explanations are global styles as they describe
how the model works; sensitivity and case-based explanations are
local styles as they attempt to justify the decision for a specific case.
These explanation styles vary along the taxonomy introduced by
previous work in other ways: e.g. sensitivity based explanation is
similar to a “what if” [25] and the case-based explanation is the
least “sound” of the explanation types discussed [20].
3.3 Fairness Issues
Given our use case, we consider fairness issues in terms of racial
discrimination. While there are other controversial features in the
dataset [14], race is generally considered inappropriate to use in
predicting criminal risk (termed protected variable). We focus on
two types of fairness issues.
3.3.1 Model Unfairness. As discussed, the COMPAS data set is
known to be racially biased, but we mitigate that bias by using the
data processing method in [9]. In the experiment, we introduce the
use of the data processing technique as a between-subject variable.
By comparing participants’ fairness judgment for a model trained
on the raw data to that of processed data, we aim to understand
whether participants could identify the model-wide fairness issue,
and whether certain explanations expose the problem better.
3.3.2 Case-specific disparate impact. Predictions from an ML al-
gorithm are not uniformly fair–consider disparate impact from a
1https://www.kaggle.com/danofer/compass
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protected variable. For example, if two individuals with identical
profile features but different racial categories receive different pre-
dictions, it should be considered unfair [8, 14]. Statistically, these
cases are on the decision boundary of the feature space given the
relatively small weight of the race factor, meaning they have low-
confidence predictions that may be unfair. In the experiment, we
introduce disparate impact by race factor as a within-subject vari-
able (i.e., each participant would be asked to judge some cases with
disparate impact and some not). We adopt a factorial design with
disparate impact and data processing. For subjects given models
after data processing [9], disparate impact is reduced. We aim to
discover how well participants identify the case-specific fairness
issues using different explanations.
Our hypothesis is that given local explanations focus on justify-
ing a particular case, they should more effectively surface fairness
discrepancies between cases. In contrast, global explanations may
require additional effort to reason about the position of the case
with respect to the decision boundary (e.g., “This person’s features
all have no impact in the model, except race”). Note that local ex-
planations may expose the case-specific fairness issue differently.
Case-based explanation exposes the boundary position with a low
percentage of cases justifying the decision. Sensitivity-based expla-
nation explicitly describes disparate impact–“Changing this person’s
race changes the prediction”.
3.4 Individual Difference factors
Based on prior work, we focus on two areas of individual factors:
cognitive style and prior position on algorithmic fairness. For cog-
nitive style, we measure individual’s need for cognition [7]. For prior
positions, we consider two levels: general position on the fairness of
using ML systems for decision support, and position on the fairness
of using a particular feature–here we focus on the race factor.
4 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
4.1 Re-offending Prediction Classifier
The model is a binary classifier predicting whether an individual in
the COMPAS data set is likely to re-offend or not, implemented by
Scikit-learn’s logistic regression. The use of a regression model is
ecologically valid—many current decision support systems use such
simple and interpretable models [35]. However, the explanation
styles we study are not limited to regression models.
We built the model using a subset of features in the COMPAS
dataset2, including Race as the feature with fairness issues. For
simplicity, we focus on two racial groups (Caucasian and African-
American), and filtered others. Other features included: Age (18-
29/30-39/40-49/50-59/>59), Charge Degree (Felony/Misdemeanor),
Number of Prior Convictions (0/1-3/4-6/7-10/>10), and Had Juve-
nile Convictions (True/False). According to Grgic-Hlaca et al. [14],
charge degrees and criminal history were deemed fair in a similar
use case. Age is also important in assessing re-offense risk. Follow-
ing statistical convention, all categorical features are dummy coded
using the median category as the reference level, where possible.
2We split the data into training set (4222 samples) and testing set (1056).
The accuracy of the model is 67.1% on raw data and 67.6% on
processed data, comparable to reports on the accuracy of COM-
PAS system [6, 21]. Note that logistic regression also produces a
confidence level implicitly in class probabilities.
4.1.1 Data processing and cases with disparate impact. We used the
method introduced in [9] to perform data processing then re-trained
the model. The resulting model reduced bias against the African
American group, as evidenced by the feature co-efficient being
reduced from 0.177 to -0.036 (A feature co-efficient of 0 corresponds
to the feature having no effect in the decision).
To identify cases with unfair treatment of disparate impact, we
follow the definition “treating one person less favorably on a for-
bidden ground than another...in a comparable situation” [8]. That
is, if perturbing a test example’s protected variable (race) changes
the algorithm’s prediction, we consider it to have disparate impact.
We found 23 cases in the raw dataset–all very near to the decision
boundary3.
4.1.2 Sampling cases for the user study. Due to user study time
constraints, we could only show each user a small sample of the
explanations. Since we intended to study fairness discrepancies
between disparately impacted and non-impacted cases, we over-
sampled the former category. Among the 23 disparately impacted
instances, we sampled all 8 unique cases (i.e. the rest had the same
feature-values as one of the 8 we sampled). From the non-impacted
group of 992 instances, we sampled 16 unique cases.
4.2 Explanation Generation
As discussed, we patterned our explanations, shown in Figure 1
(truncated version, see supplementary materials for the full ver-
sion), after the templates presented by Binns et al. [5]. While Binns
et al. manually created examples of these explanation, we devel-
oped programs to automatically generate them to obtain compa-
rable explanation versions for the same data point, controlling for
differences in representation and presentation. These generation
methods can also be broadly applied to ML prediction models using
relational features.
4.2.1 Input Influence-based Explanation. describes the decision
boundary itself. Because the feature coefficients of the logistic re-
gression model encode the relative importance of each feature, we
present them as strings of ‘+’ and ‘-’ in our explanations, as shown
in Figure 1. To do this, we discretized them into 11 buckets, based
on the range of the maximum and minimum coefficient. This type
of explanation is global since the decision boundary is a property
of the classifier, and thus is described the same way for all samples.
4.2.2 Demographic-based Explanation. describes the structure of
the training data and how it is distributed with respect to the deci-
sion boundary. We simply summarize, for training data matching
each feature category, the percentage with the same label as pre-
dicted for the presented example. This type of explanation is global
and generates the same description for all samples on each side of
the decision boundary.
3The raw data classifier’s confidence on the disparately impacted sample group had
an average of 52% and a max of 54%. The processed data classifier had average and
max confidence both at 50%.
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Explaining Models: An Empirical Study of 
Human Perception of Fairness
Jon Dodge, Vera Liao, Yunfeng Zhang, and Rachel Bellamy
Scenario
A jury has convicted Jason of a crime. Next, the judge will 
choose a sentence, informed by software that predicts whether 
Jason will commit another crime. The software makes its 
prediction based on historical data collected about many other 
people convicted of crimes.  The output of the software is 
binary, a prediction of whether or not the individual is likely to 
commit another crime.
Data Available: In this scenario, the system knows the 
following about each individual in its database:
• Race (Caucasian, African-American)
• Age Category (Under 29, 30-39, 4—49, 50-59, >59)
• Prior Convictions (No priors, 1-3, 4-6, 7-10,>10)
• Juvenile Prior Convictions (No priors, 1-3, >3)
• Charge Degree (Felony, Misdemeanor)
Overview
•Machine Learning systems are based on historical data.  If that data is biased in some way, the classifier induced 
by it will have the same bias “baked in.”
•Many methods exist to reduce bias in ML, in a statistical sense.  One example is applying a transformation to the 
data as a preprocess.
•In our study, we will create 2 classifiers: one trained on raw COMPAS data (records of recidivism in US), and 
one trained on a preprocessed version of the same data.  This setup will let us answer RQ1.
•We have created 4 types of programmatically generated explanations, which will let us answer RQ2.
•RQ1 How do classifiers’ “actual” (statistical) fairness correlate with human perception?
•RQ2 Which types of explanation are better at surfacing fairness? In which situations?
Study Design
Surveys
Review Scenario
Review Data Instance
Form and Justify Prediction
ML Prediction and Explanation
Decision Survey
Surveys (again)
Input-Influence
Demographic
CaseSensitivity
The more +s/-s means a person with that 
attribute is more/less likely to re-offend. 
*  Appears next to Iliana’s attributes 
Race 
•Caucasian (0) 
•* African-American (+) 
Age 
•* 18-29 (++++)
•30-39(+)
•…
Charge degree:
•…
Number of prior convictions
Has juvenile priors:
• Iliana’s race is African American.
If it had been Caucasian, she would have been 
predicted as NOT likely to reoffend
• Iliana’s age is 18-29.
If it had been older than 39, she would have been 
predicted as NOT likely to reoffend
The training set contained 10 individuals 
identical to Iliana
6 of them reoffend (60%)
• Race: African-American 
• Age: 18-29
• Charge degree: Misdemeanor
• Prior convictions: 0
• Has juvenile priors: Yes
Prediction:  
Likely to reoffend 
Defendant: Iliana
The prediction is based on the likelihood of previous 
cases with different attributes re-offended or not. 
A * appears next to Iliana’s features.
Race 
• 40% in Caucasian race group re-offended
• * 55% in African-American race group re-
offended
Age 
• * 58% in 18-29 age group re-offended
• 49% in 30-39 age group re-offended
• …
Charge degree:
• …
Number of prior convictions
Has juvenile priors:
Figure 1: Examples of explanations generated using the raw data classifier, adjusted and truncated for brevity. Consult our sup-
plementary materials for full explanation output from both classifiers – as seen by participants (including * and highlights).
4.2.3 Sensitivity-based Explanation. seeks to modify the presented
sample along each feature until the prediction changes. When the
prediction does change, we report back to the user the necessary
feature change to produce the change in output. This type of ex-
planation is local as it is specific to each presented example, and
justifies the decision by indicating changes needed to produce a
different output.
4.2.4 Case-based Explanation. does a nearest neighbor search in
the training data to find similar cases. Since our study has a large
data set with respect to the feature space, we frequently find neigh-
bors occupying the same feature space location as the sample pre-
sented for explanation. When this is the case, we show the % of
those neighbors with the same label as the prediction. When no
exact matches are found, we simply show the features and label for
the nearest neighbor in the training data. This is a modification to
the design in Binns et al., which describes only a single identical or
similar case. This explanation is local, and attempts to justify the
decision by indicating similar examples with similar outputs.
5 METHODOLOGY
Our study adopted a mixed design by having data processing (raw
or processed) and explanation styles (4 styles) as between-subject
variables, and disparate impact as a within-subject variable. Each
participant completed 6 fairness judgment trials in a random order,
where each trial consisted of judging a single case. 2 trials were
randomly selected from the 8 disparately impacted cases, and 4
trials from the 16 non-impacted cases in the test data.
In September 2018 we recruited 160 Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers, with the criteria that the worker must live in the US and
have completed more than 1000 tasks with at least a 98% approval
rate. They were randomly assigned to the 8 conditions (2 data pro-
cessing treatments × 4 explanations). Among them, 62.5% are male,
78.8% are self-identified as Caucasian, 29.4% are under 30, and 13.3%
are above 50. In our quantitative analysis, we included participants’
race and gender as co-variance but observed no significant effect.
5.1 Study Procedure
We conducted an online survey-style study. Participants first pro-
vided informed consent, then reviewed a scenario about a ML sys-
tem developed to assess defendants’ re-offense risk, to help a judge
make bail decisions. Each participant was given 6 trials, and within
each trial, the participant would first review information about
an individual (Figure 1, center region), then make his or her own
prediction about whether that individual would re-offend. This step
was to ensure they carefully consider the features used in the pre-
diction. Subsequently, they would be presented with the prediction
from the machine learning classifier with one of the four styles
of explanations. They were asked to rate agreement with: “How
the software made the prediction was fair” based on a 1 (Strongly
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) Likert Scale, together with an open
question justifying their rating.
We checked attention after the third trial, by asking participants
to find the feature not used by the software from a list of choices.
All participants passed the check. After completing all tasks, partici-
pants would answer a surveymeasuring their individual differences,
and collecting demographic data. On average the study took 18 min
to complete, and each participant was compensated with $3.
5.2 Individual Differences
We measured two types of individual differences: prior positions
on algorithmic fairness, and cognitive style. For prior positions,
IUI ’19, March 17–20, 2019, Marina del Rey, CA, USA J Dodge et al.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
3
4
5
6
case sensitivity influence demographic
Fa
irn
e
ss
 R
at
in
g
Figure 2: Overall mean ratings of fairness, per explanation
type, data process treatment (raw= , processed=▲), and sam-
ple group (impacted=blue dashed lines, non-impacted=red
solid lines). The lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
we further differentiate between one’s general position on using
ML systems to assist decision-making, and position on the fairness
of using race as a feature. We use a semantic differential scale
that is often used to measure attitude on controversial topics [24].
Specifically, we ask participants to rate the statements “Considering
race as a factor in criminal risk prediction” and “Using machine
learning software to replace or augment human decision making”,
on 5 pairs of bipolar adjectives such as “harmful-beneficial” and
“unethical-ethical” with a 7-point Likert scale. The ratings of the 5
pairs are averaged to represent the individual’s prior position. The
Cronbach Alpha for the scale on general ML position is 0.95, and for
the race feature is 0.98, showing excellent consistency. For cognitive
style, we chose to measure one’s Need for Cognition using only 4 of
the items from the standard scale [7], due to the time constraints.
6 RESULTS: QUANTITATIVE
We start with examining the effect of explanation style, data process-
ing (raw/processed) and disparate impact (true/false) on participants’
fairness judgment (RQ1). We then explore how individual differ-
ences, including prior position on fairness of ML, prior position on
fairness of using the race feature, and need for cognition, impacted
the judgment (RQ2). All statistical analyses were done in R. The
lmerTest package was used to run mixed-model regressions.
6.1 Explanation, data processing, and disparate
impact
Given the complexity of the statistical model, we first describe
the trends with the descriptive data, then report statistical testing
results. In Figure 2, we plot the mean and the 95% confidence in-
terval of the mean of fairness ratings in all experiment treatments,
showing several trends:
(1) Predictions made on the processed data (triangles) were rated
fairer than those on the raw data (circles). It suggests that par-
ticipants perceived fairness issues for the model trained on the
raw data, and the processing technique mitigated the problem.
(2) Predictions made on cases with disparate impact (blue dashed
lines) were rated less fair than those without it (red solid lines).
This shows participants’ fairness perceptions align with the
presence of a fairness discrepancy between groups.
(3) Explanation styles made nuanced differences. As expected,
the two local explanations led to higher discrepancy of fairness
ratings between disparately impacted cases and non-impacted
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Figure 3: Same data as Figure 2, split by prior position on the
fairness of using the race feature. Left: Participants that con-
sider using race “Unfair” (race_pos < 4). Right: Participants
that consider using race “Fair” or neutral (race_pos >= 4).
cases (difference between the dashed and solid lines) than the
two global explanations. Thus, the former are more effective in
exposing case-specific fairness issues. Moreover, this difference
is most prominent for sensitivity-based explanations applied to
raw data. This could be caused by sensitivity-based explanation
being the most explicit in exposing disparate impact, while data
processing mitigated the problem.
We now report the statistical significance of these observed
trends. In particular, to validate that sensitivity-based explanation is
most effective in exposing the disparate impact issue in the raw data,
we expect to see a three-way interaction between explanation style,
data processing, and disparate impact. We construct a mixed-effect
regression model with the three-way interaction (and all the lower
order interactions) as fixed effects, and participant as a random
effect. We control for gender and race as covariances and neither
has significant effect. The three-way interaction we expected is
not significant, F (3, 152) = 0.54, p = 0.66. There is a marginally
significant4 two-way interaction between explanation style and
disparate impact, F (3, 152) = 2.35, p = 0.07, and significant main
effect of disparate impact, F (1, 152) = 103.25, p < 0.001, and data
processing, F (1, 152) = 4.65, p = 0.03.
The main effect of data processing and disparate impact prove
statistical significance for the first two observed trends. The two-
way interaction indicates that explanation styles had differential
impact on exposing the disparate impact issue. We conduct pairwise
comparison for this interactive effect to identify between which
explanation styles this perceived fairness discrepancy significantly
differ. We found that if we use sensitivity-based explanation as the
reference level, influence-based explanation is significantly differ-
ent, F (1, 156) = 5.14, p = 0.02, and demographic-based explanation
is marginally significant, F (1, 156) = 3.29, p = 0.07; If we use case-
based explanation as the reference, influence-based explanation is
marginally different, F (1, 156) = 3.36, p = 0.07. This validates the
observation that local explanations are more effective than global
ones in exposing fairness discrepancies in different cases.
While we did not find statistical significance of the three-way
interaction that validates the effectiveness of sensitivity-based ex-
planation, a possibility is that there are individual differences for
which the model did not account. In the next section, we explore
that possibility.
4We consider p < 0.05 as significant, and 0.05 ≤ p < 0.10 as marginally significant,
following statistical convention [12]
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6.2 Individual differences
We enter the following factors into the model: prior position on
using machine learning to assist decision-making (ML position),
prior position on fairness of using the race feature (race position),
and need for cognition. We start from four level interactions of
each of the individual difference factors with the three manipulated
variables (explanation, data processing, disparate impact), and then
iteratively reduce it to lower-level interactions if it is not significant.
We eventually arrive in a model with the following terms: a four
way interaction between race position and the three manipulated
factors, F (3, 144) = 2.59, p = 0.05, and a marginally significant
two-way interaction between ML position and explanation style,
F (3, 137) = 2.43, p = 0.07. We did not find need for cognition to
make a difference and removed it.
By including these individual difference factors in the model,
we now find the three-way interaction between explanation style,
data processing, and disparate impact to be significant, F (3, 144) =
2.96, p = 0.03 (its lower-level two-way interactions as well). In
addition to the main effect of data processing (F (1, 137) = 4.68,
p = 0.03) and disparate impact (F (1, 144) = 28.86, p < 0.001) as
in the original model, we also find a main effect of ML position
(F (1, 137) = 17.31, p < 0.001), race position (F (1, 137) = 6.43,
p = 0.01), and a marginally significant main effect of explanation
style, F (3, 137) = 2.11, p = 0.10.
The above significant three-way and four-way terms, after in-
cluding race position in the analysis, demonstrate that the con-
sideration of this individual factor “de-noised” the data. In other
words, it is only when an individual considers using race to be
unfair, that a sensitivity-based explanation like this–“If Nolan had
been ‘Caucasian’, he would have been predicted to be NOT likely to
re-offend”–heightens the concern and significantly lowers the per-
ceived fairness.When an individual does not consider it problematic
to use race as a decision factor, they would not perceive such an
explanation negatively. This trend is illustrated in Figure 3, where
we separate participants who considered the race factor unfair and
those who considered it fair-to-neutral (33.1% of all participants).
In fact, for those who consider race to be a fair or neutral feature
to use (Figure 3, Right), they did not perceive predictions made on
the raw data (circles) to be less fair than processed data (triangles),
and generally rated fairness to be higher (thus the main effect of
prior position on race).
The main effect of ML position and its interactive effect with
explanation style indicates that a general positive position on al-
gorithmic fairness enhanced perceived fairness, and also led to
different explanation preferences. We conducted pairwise com-
parison between styles of explanation, and found this interactive
effect with ML position to be significant for influence-based ex-
planation, F (1, 148) = 6.25, p = 0.01, and marginally significant
for demographic-based explanation, F (1, 148) = 2.77, p = 0.10, if
using case-based explanation as the reference. It is significant for
influence-based explanation, F (1, 148) = 3.73, p = 0.05, if using
case-based explanation as the reference. This implies that people
who trust ML systems gain even higher confidence in the fairness
of a prediction given global explanation (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Overall mean fairness ratings, broken down by
prior position on “Trust in ML” (high trust=×, low trust=3).
It is worth noting that after controlling for these individual
factors, we now see a marginally significant main effect of explana-
tion style. Pairwise comparisons show that case-based explanation
was rated marginally significantly less fair than influence-based
(F (1, 153) = 3.51, p = 0.06) and demographic-based explanation
(F (1, 148) = 3.20, p = 0.08). We consider it as evidence that case-
based explanation is seen as generally less fair.
To summarize, in response to RQ1 and RQ2, we found evidence
that: 1) Case-based explanation is seen as generally less fair; Global
explanations further enhance perceived fairness for those who have
general trust for machine learning systems to make fair decisions.
2) Local explanations are more effective than global explanations
at exposing case-specific fairness issues, or fairness discrepancies
between different cases. Sensitivity-based explanations are the most
effective in exposing the fairness issue of disparate impact made
by a particular feature—but only if the individual views using that
feature as unfair. 3) In general, we show that individuals’ prior
position on ML trust and feature fairness have significant impact
on how they react to explanations, and possibly more so than
differences in cognitive styles.
7 RESULTS: QUALITATIVE
Along with collecting fairness ratings, we asked participants to
justify their judgment. The authors reviewed this data and used
open coding to extract themes in the answers. Here we discuss
two groups of themes. One is to understand how participants made
fairness judgments. Another is on participants’ feedback for the
four styles of explanations.
7.1 How is fairness judgment made?
In the open-ended answers, we investigated the criteria participants
used to judge fairness. We see variations in reliance on the pro-
vided explanations, and depth of reasoning about the algorithm’s
processes, providing further evidence of individual differences in
the criteria used to make fairness judgments of ML systems.
7.1.1 General trust or distrust in ML systems. Some participants
provided reasons not specific to a case or explanation, but that
general trust or distrust of ML systems dominated their judgment,
as they tended to give consistent ratings across cases. Reasons for a
general trust include “based on objective data is better than subjective
opinions” (CR-31)5, “large data set” (CR-37), “uses statistics based
on prior knowledge to make a judgment” (IR-176). In contrast, some
participants considered generalization by statistics unfair–“it might
5Participant IDs give treatment info, explanation (Sensitivity, Case, Input-Influence,
Demographic) followed by data processing (Raw, Processed).
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be unfair to group everybody together - makes more sense for the
judge to have individual judgment.” (IP-184), while others think that
“there needs to be a human element to the decision” (CR-62). These
observations corroborate Binns et al. [5] and further validate that
participants varied on their general position on using ML system
for criminal justice, and it influenced their fairness judgment.
7.1.2 Features used. Participants frequently cited features used by
the algorithm as reasons for fairness or unfairness. Some explicitly
differentiated between the process of the algorithm and the feature
considered–“The software makes it’s decisions based on it’s algo-
rithm, so I believe it is fair and impartial on that account. However,
some of the categories it is programmed to consider, such as age and
race, are unfair” (SP-71). It is interesting to note that we observe
individual differences in the position on the fairness of race feature
in the qualitative results as well. While many participants called
out the problem of considering race, a few participants who saw
the processed data commented that “[if] race was not a predictor [it]
may not accurately reflect the reality” (DP-68). There is also some
controversy on using age and juvenile priors as features. Partici-
pants’ comments echo results from a previous study [14] showing
that people consider multiple dimensions (e.g., relevance, disparate
outcome, volitionality) in their judgments about the fairness of fea-
tures used in decision-making algorithms, and individuals weigh
these dimensions differently.
7.1.3 Lacking features. As observed in [5], several participants
criticized the limited features used in our simple model. Some sug-
gested to have more detailed information on current features, such
as “frequency of priors or the interval of time since the last prior in
order to get a more accurate assessment of what one’s prior record
means” (DP-53). Others are less optimistic about the possible suf-
ficiency of features to ensure fairness–“software cannot fully take
into account environmental factors that cause people to go down a
bad path” (CR-76).
7.1.4 Prediction process. Many participants based their fairness
judgment on their understanding of the algorithms’ process. Some,
especially those presented with global explanations, closely exam-
ined explanation details, e.g. “Software seems to be flawed in major
areas... improper weighing of distant vs recent past, and a question-
able choice of how to evaluate probabilities in each case” (DR-119).
Some also considered failure to account for external factors, e.g.
“the number may be relatively accurate for the race and charge degree
categories, but if the [past] laws were different they would probably be
higher” (DR-107). Moreover, multiple participants attributed their
low fairness ratings to insufficient understanding of process, or
“‘how’ the data is used” (DR-172).
7.1.5 Data issue. A few participants questioned the underlying
data used. Almost all of them were in either the demographic- or
case-based explanation conditions, as these two styles leverage
information about distributions of similar cases to explain the deci-
sion. For example, “‘Not re-offend’ rate for African Americans is a
little low. I think the percentage may be higher in reality... data could
have been biased” (DR-107).
7.2 Explanation styles
Belowwe summarize codes that are prominent for each explanation
style. These results could help us better understand the benefits
and drawbacks of each explanation style, and inform future work
on designs of ML explanations.
7.2.1 Influence based. It is a global explanation that faithfully de-
scribes how each feature contributes to the algorithm’s decision-
making process. We observed that this explanation prompted com-
ments on details of the process, such as the weights of different
features, and the trends with regard to different categories of a
feature, e.g. “it is fair because it doesn’t discriminate by race, but
rather on age and prior convictions... if someone exhibits a behav-
ior pattern it is likely to will continue, and I think people who are
young are more apt to take risks” (IP-208). On the one hand, detailed
description of the algorithm process adds to the confidence in par-
ticipants’ judgments, which may help explain its enhancement of
fairness perception among those trusting ML algorithms. On the
other hand, it exposes more information to scrutiny, and is thus
subject to critiques from the heterogeneous standards of fairness.
7.2.2 Demographic based. This is a type of global explanation
that does not expose the process of the algorithm, but justifies the
decision with the data distributions. Sometimes, the distributions
were seen as convincing, e.g. “The high percentage of people with
more than 10 prior convictions who end up reoffending was staggering,
and justifies the prediction” (DP-57). Other times, participants found
its explanation of the process inadequate, as the percentages do
not clearly connect to an outcome–“The percentages aren’t high
enough. It could go either way” (DR-157). Sometimes it also directed
participants attention to the potential biases of underlying data.
7.2.3 Sensitivity based. Themain benefit of sensitivity-based expla-
nation seems to be its conciseness and explicitly directing attention
to features relevant to the particular decision. It appears to be con-
vincing and easy to process when a decision is uncontroversial
–“The rationale is so basic (no prior offenses) that it has to be fair”
(SR-138). “It’s taking into consideration everything that we would
and puts it into an easy to read manner” (SP-220). Consistent with
our quantitative results, for disparately impacted cases where the
race factor is explicitly mentioned, sensitivity-based explanation
heightens the concern and was perceived most negatively–“It says
that in the same situation, if the offender were African-American
rather than Caucasian, they would have been likely to offend. This is
racial profiling and inaccurate in my opinion.” (SR-124).
7.2.4 Case based. As we found in the quantitative results, case-
based explanation was judged to be the least fair—and the qual-
itative results provided reasons. First, some found it to provide
little information about how the algorithm arrives at a conclusion.
Second, the number of identical cases and the percentage of cases
supporting the decision are often considered too small to justify the
decision–“It was unfair for the defendant because she was compared
to only 22 other identical individuals... not to mention that only a little
over 50% reoffended.” (CR-61). This observation is consistent with
Binns et al. [5], however, our work is based on the actual output of
a ML model trained on a real dataset – allowing us to empirically
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show a limitation of case-based explanation6. Lastly, we found vari-
ations in individuals’ positions on the fairness of the “explained
process” (as opposed to the actual algorithm process) to make deci-
sions based on identical cases. While some people consider it to be
fair to “compare the actions of people with similar history and back-
grounds” (CP-200), others questioned the underlying rationale such
as “is anyone really identical if more things considered” (CP-201).
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Supporting different needs of fairness
judgment
The most important take-away from our study is that there are mul-
tiple aspects and heterogeneous standards in making fairness judg-
ments, beyond evaluating features, as studied in previous work [14].
Our experiment highlights two types of fairness issues: unfair mod-
els (e.g., learned from biased data), and fairness discrepancy of
different cases (e.g., in different regions of the feature space). Our
qualitative results further illustrate that algorithmic fairness is
evaluated by various dimensions including data, features, process,
statistical validity, as well as broader ethical and societal concerns.
Our results highlight the need to provide different styles of expla-
nation tailored for exposing different fairness issues. For example,
we show that local explanations are more effective in exposing
fairness discrepancies between different cases, while global expla-
nations seem to render more confidence in understanding themodel
and generally enhance the fairness perception. Hybridizing the two
techniques reveals a possible human-in-the-loop workflow; using
global explanations to understand and evaluate the model, and local
explanations to scrutinize individual cases.
It is critical to note that different regions of feature space may
have varied levels of fairness and different types of fairness issues.
This calls for development of fine-grained sampling methods and
explanation designs to better support fairness judgment of ML sys-
tems. To that end, we envision an active-learning paradigm for
fairness improvement, where the system interactively queries the
human for fairness judgment of its predictions, together with ex-
planation options, then optimizes the algorithm based on feedback.
Our qualitative results suggest another useful categorization of
explanation styles: process oriented v.s. data oriented explanation.
The case- and demographic-based explanations we studied leverage
information on data distribution to justify its decision but reveal
less on how the decision was made. Influence- and sensitivity-based
explanations link each feature to the decision. We observe a general
preference for process-oriented (how) explanations, although a
focus on data has the potential benefit of directing attention to
issues in the data and dilutes the “blame” on the algorithms.
8.2 Individual differences and descriptive
fairness
Another contribution of our study is to empirically demonstrate
how individuals’ prior positions on algorithmic fairness impact
6We found that 16% of the test data exhibited the failure mode of contradicting the
claim (< 50% of individuals with identical features share label). Meanwhile insufficient
justification of the claim (between 45% and 55% label matches) was quite common,
with 24% of the test data. The prevalence of these failure modes indicates inherent
“unsoundness.”
their reaction to different explanations. We differentiate between a
general position on algorithmic fairness, and position on fairness
of a particular feature used.
The difference between normative (prescriptively defining what
is fair) versus descriptive fairness and its implication for algorithmic
fairness has been discussed in previous work [14]. Empirically, we
show that even though race is considered a protected variable,
individual positions on its fairness still vary (close to one third
of participants considered it neutral or fair to use). This indicates
a lack of agreement on the meaning of moral concepts, a result
Binns et al. [5] hinted at qualitatively. In different contexts, an
algorithm developer may have to choose between a normative or a
descriptive position of fairness, and it is important to be aware of
the variation of fairness position in the population. For example, if
a ML system takes a normative position and aims to eliminate pre-
defined biases based on people’s feedback, it may need to account
for their prior positions to weigh the feedback differently. It may
be arguable whether explanation should always attempt soundness
and completeness for all individuals. On the other hand, if a system
aims to provide optimal decision support for individual needs, it
would be useful to provide mechanisms for individuals to express
their prior positions as direct input for the algorithm (similar to the
idea of active-learning by tuning features [29, 31]).
8.3 Limitations
We performed our study with crowdworkers, rather than judges
who would be the actual users of this type of tool. Additionally,
there are many styles and elements of explanations not studied
here. One example is confidence, which we declined to present to
participants because we could not control for it.
9 CONCLUSION
Our work provides empirical insights on how different styles of
explanation impact people’s fairness judgment of ML systems, par-
ticularly the differences between a global explanation describing
the model and a local explanation justifying a particular decision.
We highlight that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for effective
explanation–it depends on the kinds of fairness issues and user
profiles. Providing hybrid explanations, allowing both overview of
the model and scrutiny of individual cases, may be necessary for
accurate fairness judgment. Furthermore, we show that individuals’
prior positions on algorithmic fairness influence how they react
to different explanation types. The results call for a personalized
approach to explaining ML systems. However, specific to fairness,
ML systems may need to take a normative or descriptive position
in different contexts, which may differentially require corrective or
adaptive actions considering individual differences in their fairness
positions.
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